Formal proofs of operator identities by a single formal computation

A formal computation proving a new operator identity from known ones is, in principle, restricted by domains and codomains of linear operators involved, since not any two operators can be added or composed. Algebraically, identities can be modelled by noncommutative polynomials and such a formal computation proves that the polynomial corresponding to the new identity lies in the ideal generated by the polynomials corresponding to the known identities. In order to prove an operator identity, however, just proving membership of the polynomial in the ideal is not enough, since the ring of noncommutative polynomials ignores domains and codomains. We show that it suffices to additionally verify compatibility of this polynomial and of the generators of the ideal with the labelled quiver that encodes which polynomials can be realized as linear operators. Then, for every consistent representation of such a quiver in a linear category, there exists a computation in the category that proves the corresponding instance of the identity. Moreover, by assigning the same label to several edges of the quiver, the algebraic framework developed allows to model different versions of an operator by the same indeterminate in the noncommutative polynomials.     

On the numerical solution of ill‐conditioned linear systems by regularization and iteration

We propose to reduce the (spectral) condition number of a given linear system by adding a suitable diagonal matrix to the system matrix, in particular by shifting its spectrum. Iterative procedures are then adopted to recover the solution of the original system. The case of real symmetric positive definite matrices is considered in particular, and several numerical examples are given. This approach has some close relations with Riley's method and with Tikhonov regularization. Moreover, we identify approximately the aforementioned procedure with a true action of preconditioning.     

Collective Strategy Condensation: When Envy Splits Societies

Human societies are characterized by three constituent features, besides others. (A) Options, as for jobs and societal positions, differ with respect to their associated monetary and non-monetary payoffs. (B) Competition leads to reduced payoffs when individuals compete for the same option as others. (C) People care about how they are doing relatively to others. The latter trait—the propensity to compare one’s own success with that of others—expresses itself as envy. It is shown that the combination of (A)–(C) leads to spontaneous class stratification. Societies of agents split endogenously into two social classes, an upper and a lower class, when envy becomes relevant. A comprehensive analysis of the Nash equilibria characterizing a basic reference game is presented. Class separation is due to the condensation of the strategies of lower-class agents, which play an identical mixed strategy. Upper-class agents do not condense, following individualist pure strategies. The model and results are size-consistent, holding for arbitrary large numbers of agents and options. Analytic results are confirmed by extensive numerical simulations. An analogy to interacting confined classical particles is discussed.